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Introduction 
 
1. The last few years have been a difficult time for Pakistan. A growing militancy at 
home, very serious floods, severe power outages, shortage in supply of natural gas, 
weakening exports on account of continuing slowdown in the main markets for the country’s 
merchandize, and a weak foreign exchange position, have dealt a serious blow to investor 
confidence. This has led to a sharp reduction in investment and a slump in the rate of 
economic growth that has now lasted for four years—the longest downturn in the country’s 
history. There is also anecdotal evidence of considerable amounts of capital flight from the 
country. Policy responses to these challenges have not been effective; noticeably in the area 
of tax collection, management of public enterprise losses and handling of energy 
predicament. Federal-provincial relations have also become difficult. This has resulted in 
persistence of large fiscal deficits which financed largely by bank borrowing have led to high 
rates of inflation. 
 
2. In contrast to an economic situation that remains very challenging, there has been 
considerable progress in developing a new political order that is likely to be more durable 
than those that preceded it. With the settling of a number of outstanding political structural 
issues there are good prospects that a real democratic system can develop under a genuine 
federal setup. The test of the leadership that will emerge following the next elections will be 
to ensure that the new political freedoms and stability are used to strengthen the state and 
revive the economy.  
 
3. At this time Pakistan faces two immediate problems: the longest downturn in its 
history and serious macroeconomic imbalances, and the absence of consensus on how to 
place the economy on a plane of higher and sustainable rate of GDP growth. The 
policymakers must address these inter-related problems simultaneously. Growth needs to 
become the basis of a new development paradigm. At the same time, large macroeconomic 
imbalances must be eliminated. Progress on one front will improve the prospects on the 
other. Improved macroeconomic situation will improve the investment climate for both 
foreign and domestic investors. The increased confidence and recovery in growth will lay the 
basis of both expanded revenues and exports. This paper provides some ideas that could help 
develop a comprehensive, consistent and credible economic strategy that is urgently needed.  
Such a ‘home grown’ program could also assist in negotiations with the Fund that could 
become necessary to relieve the pressure of repayments of over USD 5 billion due to the 
institution in the next eighteen months.  
 
4. Many of the problems and issues that constrain steady progress towards sustained 
high growth and financial stability are deep seated and have persisted for decades. While 
there are no silver bullets or magical formulae for solving structural problems, a broad 
agreement on the nature of the problems, a strong political will to undertake reforms and 
initiation of critical first steps would have significant pay-off. This will be the case even in the 
short and medium term, defined as the next two to three years. 
 
5. This paper is divided into four sections. The first provides a quick overview of the 
current political and economic situation, focusing in particular on the stagnation of growth 
and deepening macroeconomic imbalances, and a fast approaching balance of payments 
crisis. The second section focuses on ways to improve macro-economic balances especially 
public finances not only by increasing revenues but restructuring expenditures including 
A Growth and Adjustment Strategy for Pakistan 
3 
 
 
reductions in subsidies to the non-poor and increasing the effectiveness of public spending. 
The third section focuses on critical elements in reviving growth. The paper argues for a 
comprehensive growth strategy which focuses on governance as a central issue. Reversing 
the decline of public institutions and improving the quality of governance will provide 
confidence in the country’s economic future and will result in increasing domestic 
investment. Other elements of the strategy must involve improving the energy situation; 
correcting the long neglect of exports and using international trade as a driver of growth  
(including opportunities that may become available by the intended normalization of trade 
with India); reversing the decline on growth rate of agriculture both by supporting 
diversification in the cropping pattern; processing of agricultural products, and more 
economical use of inputs (especially water); a new push on human development including 
quality of education in public schools, skills training and a new emphasis on adult literacy; 
and, a new compact with the private sector that phases out economic rents, reduces the 
burden of unnecessary or ineffective regulation not excluding labor legislation, and 
strengthens incentives for  investment and  productivity improvements especially in moving 
up the value added chain. Finally, the fourth section presents a summary of key actions that 
government could take along with a timeline for implementation. 
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Current Political and Economic Situation 
 
Political Backdrop 
 
6. The last five years represent somewhat of a paradox. On one hand, governance has 
declined further, corruption has been on the rise and effective decision making has suffered 
as merit has not been the key criteria for senior appointments. Militancy and terrorism have 
risen and there was foot dragging on the establishment of appropriate mechanisms for 
ensuring accountability of senior public officials both from the political and bureaucratic 
sides. On the other, the higher judiciary—especially the very independent minded Supreme 
Court—became very proactive in governance issues and the free media especially electronic 
media came to play an important role in highlighting public policy issues and exposing 
wrong doings. 
 
7. Furthermore, some basic constitutional changes were instituted that augur well for 
the future of democracy in a meaningful federal setting. The 18th Amendment to the 
Constitution passed in April 2010 restored in letter and spirit parliamentary democracy and 
the relationship between the federation and the provinces as originally envisaged in 1973 
Constitution. The Amendment also laid down the procedures for nominating judges to the 
higher judiciary and made the office of Chief Election Commissioner autonomous of both the 
executive and the parliament. The Amendment also laid down the procedure for appointing 
the head of National Accountability Bureau (NAB). Through the subsequent 19th and 20th 
Amendments, procedures for appointments of High Court and Supreme Court were clarified 
and the arrangements for putting in place a caretaker government to oversee elections were 
prescribed. The final authority for the appointment of the caretaker prime minister was 
given to the Chief Election Commissioner in case the outgoing prime minister and the leader 
of the opposition could not agree on a nominee. 
 
8. These changes should move the country towards a durable political structure which 
should ensure democracy and stability. The stage has been set for providing the next set of 
political leaders to effectively cope with the large looming problems of large macroeconomic 
imbalances, slow growth and poor governance. The government will be well served to 
prepare a credible strategy that addresses all the three interlinked issues: stabilization, 
reviving growth and improving governance. This paper discusses some of the key elements 
that need to be accommodated in such a strategy.   
 
Salient Features of the Current Economic Situation 
 
9. GDP growth averaged less than 3 per cent per annum over 2008-12 and is expected 
by to be at roughly the same level in 2012-13. This low rate of growth was due in part—but 
only in part—to the impact of floods that did a great deal of damage in 2010 and 2011. Some 
of it was also due to the slowdown in global economic expansion. But the relatively sluggish 
performance of the economy was also the result of a number of policy failures. One of these 
resulted in serious power shortages that became a major constraint on economic activity. 
Rough estimates of loss of output due to energy shortages are as high as 2 per cent of GDP 
per annum. 
 
10. In the critical power sector, there has been further deterioration. First, the line losses 
have not shown any decline in the last few years and remain high at 21 per cent. Second, load 
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shedding, 35-40 per cent at present, has worsened and is not expected to show a decline in 
the next few years as the imbalances between supply and demand are likely to persist. Third, 
even though electricity tariffs have risen by 75 per cent in recent years, power subsidies are 
large and including arrears reached a peak of 2.2 per cent of GDP in 2011-12—continuing in 
2012-13. 
 
11. Equally important gross fixed capital formation has dropped more than 30 per cent 
in real terms over 2008-12 and the ratio of fixed investment to GDP at around 11 per cent in 
FY 2012 was lowest over half a century. If proper allowance is made for normal depreciation 
of capital—wear and tear and obsolescence of machinery and running down of 
infrastructure—the net additions to nation’s capital stock is small right now—this against the 
background of loss of capital due to a major earthquake in 2005 and devastating floods in 
2010 and 2011. 
 
12. It is also worth mentioning in this context that disruption and hardship caused by 
power outages apart, private consumption has not suffered at all in the last three or four 
years: according to Pakistan Statistical Bureau, private consumption expenditures in real 
terms were 13.7 per cent higher than in 2008-09 and 27.7 per cent higher than in 2007-08 
which was a depressed year due to sharp increases in international prices of oil and food 
grains. But even in the last three years there was an increase of around 8 per cent in the 
average real per capita consumption. Two factors have made this possible. On one hand, the 
Gross National Income (GNI) has risen faster than GDP because of large influx of worker 
remittances and generally better terms of trade compared to 2007-08. The other explanation 
is worrisome. As investment climate deteriorated for a number of reasons, there was a switch 
from investment to consumption. Real investment is now much lower than it was at its peak 
in 2006-07. The declining trend in investment needs to be reversed if growth is to be revived. 
Fiscal policy must play a key role in this respect. But more generally, political leadership can 
set an example for the nation by avoiding conspicuous consumption and extravagant life 
styles. 
 
13.  Agricultural growth which averaged nearly 4 per cent per annum over the 40 year 
period from 1960 to 2000 slowed down to around 2.5 per cent in 2001-12. This occurred 
notwithstanding a buoyant livestock sector and sharply rising level of milk production.  
Availability of water—mostly surface irrigation—which trebled between 1960 and 1990 is no 
longer increasing. Also there has not been any major breakthrough in major crop yields 
which remain low. 
 
Macroeconomic Imbalances 
 
14. Slow economic growth has been accompanied by large macroeconomic imbalances, 
and Pakistan for the first time in its history faces the danger of stagflation. Public finances 
have deteriorated very significantly and external finances are largely being kept afloat as a 
result of very large worker remittances, both through official channels and money market 
companies.  
 
15. Driven by a stagnant tax-to-GDP ratio, despite a large increase in tax revenue in 
2011-12, mounting public enterprise losses, and persistent subsidies for the power sector, 
overall fiscal deficit was over 7 per cent of GDP during the last three years FYs 2009-12: the 
reported deficit figure including large settlement of arrears was 8.5 per cent in 2011-12 and is 
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likely to exceed 8 per cent in 2012-13. The problem, however, is not only the large size of the 
deficit but what it finances and also how it is financed. Because of the stagnation of the tax-
to-GDP ratio at around 10 per cent, government revenues do not cover current expenditures, 
the revenue account deficit—negative savings on general government account—have 
averaged 3.5 per cent of GDP in FYs 2010-12 and have been responsible for half of the overall 
fiscal deficit. 
 
16.  The financing of the overall fiscal deficit has relied heavily on inflationary means. 
Total bank financing during the FYs 2011 and 2012 averaged over 3.5 per cent of GDP, more 
than half the fiscal deficit. The direct financing of the fiscal deficit by the State Bank of 
Pakistan has been curtailed, but the financing of the government operations, by large 
commercial banks, has been possible only through huge liquidity infusion by the State Bank 
of Pakistan. Consequently, consumer price inflation averaged 12 per cent annually during the 
three years FY 2010-12 but has moderated to 8.0 per cent in the first nine months of FY 
2013. This was partly due to a change in base year of Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 
2000-1 to 2007-08 and reportedly a substantial underreporting in the inflation of house rent 
and gas prices. 
  
17. While the large fiscal imbalances have persisted, constrained foreign exchange is 
becoming increasingly critical. The current account balance of payments deficit was USD 4.3 
billion or 2 per cent of GDP in FY 2012. In relative size, a 2 per cent of GDP current account 
bop may not appear large but in Pakistan’s case it must be viewed against the background of 
potentially volatile external flows. The sharp increases in the flow of remittances—18 per 
cent in FY 2012, increasing to a total of USD 13.2 billion—may not be sustainable. Loss of 
confidence in economy’s future may discourage some of the remitters to send money to the 
homeland preferring to wait out the difficult period. Indeed the growth in worker 
remittances slowed down in the first nine months of FY 2013 to only 6 per cent over the 
same period last year. Exports which contracted 2.8 per cent last year have not shown any 
signs of recovery so far this year due both to supply bottlenecks and competitiveness issues. 
Exports of goods in first nine months of FY 2013 were flat compared to the corresponding 
period a year ago. 
 
18. The most serious and urgent problem is that the capital account is under great 
pressure. Because of large repayments to IMF (USD 1.15 billion) in FY 2012—a 50 per cent 
decline in direct foreign investment to USD 800 million—and only modest inflows of long-
term loans (USD 500 million), liquid foreign exchange reserves held by the State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP) dropped by USD 4 billion in FY 2012. With a further repayment of USD 1.8 
billion during first eight months of 2012-13, SBP net reserves had fallen to USD 7.5 billion by 
mid March 2013. The present level of reserves is less than 2 months’ of imports of goods and 
services; and its continuous decline is putting pressure on the Rupee which is depreciating at 
close to 1 per cent a month. More importantly, repayments including interest of USD 3 
billion are due to IMF in the remaining part of calendar 2013 (March-December) and 
another USD 2.1 billion in calendar year 2014. 
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Reducing Macro-economic Imbalances 
 
Improving Public finances  
 
19. Improving public finances is an immediate and critical need. This, however, is not  
only an issue of an orderly reduction in fiscal deficit through improving revenues and cutting 
back of expenditures but must also involve undertaking a substantial restructuring and 
reprioritizing of expenditures to support economic growth. An objective should also be to 
eliminate the sizable negative general government savings—in recent years, as indicated 
above, was as high as 3 per cent of GDP—by requiring that government revenues cover all 
current expenditures in two to three years. At the same time, it is important that dependence 
on bank financing of the deficit be curtailed and much greater efforts should be made by 
mobilizing resources through non-bank sector and liquidation and sale of considerable state 
assets both at the federal and provincial levels. Consideration should be given for the sale of 
landholdings of some of the public sector enterprises through public auctions—there is a lot 
of land owned by the railways, some of it in large cities across the country. The proceeds 
from such sales should be sequestered in a special fund for future generations.    
 
20. A balanced approach is needed—which reduces fiscal imbalances but at the same 
time improves economic efficiency and growth orientation of the economy, helps reduce 
income inequalities, and moderates the rate of inflation. If adopted, it would avoid the 
mistakes of the past that have resulted in uneven growth and inequitable distribution of 
growth benefits. A major restructuring of public expenditures from defense to development, 
from wasteful administrative expenditures and subsidies to non-poor would be a substantial 
undertaking and in some cases may yield results only slowly. But a move towards a 
comprehensive reform is urgently needed if economic stability is to be restored, confidence 
of investors, both foreign and domestic, is to be revived and recovery of economic growth is 
to be assured. 
 
Tax Revenue 
 
21. Pakistan has one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios among developing countries of any 
size. Yet periodic efforts to make tax machinery more effective have not succeeded. More 
than a decade ago an effort was made to reform Federal Board of Revenue (FBR). This was 
done under President Pervez Musharraf, however the results were disappointing. The tax-to- 
GDP ratio of 9.9 per cent in 2011-12, though representing a significant improvement over the 
previous year, was lower than the ratio a decade earlier. 
 
22. There are several structural problems with the Pakistan tax system. First, the income 
tax, which should be a source of progressive taxation, is ineffective and has very limited 
reach. Second, proposals for expenditure taxation in the form of a comprehensive value 
added tax, to replace the outmoded sales tax, has met political resistance. The fact that there 
is only very limited capital gains tax and no estate tax means that the burden of tax falls 
lightly on the rich and thus fiscal policies contribute to income inequalities. Finally, 
provincial taxes mobilize barely 0.5 per cent of GDP because property tax is light and 
agricultural income tax–a provincial subject–is practically non-existent. 
 
23.  Over the medium term, gradually raising the tax-to-GDP ratio would require actions 
on a broad front. This would require removing major weaknesses in the present system as 
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noted above. In the short-run, two to three years, the greatest pay off appears to be in three 
areas: an appropriate structure of income tax at the federal level, an increase in property tax 
and an increase in the levy agricultural tax at the provincial level.  
 
Individual Income Tax 
 
24. The biggest problem area and the one that has perhaps the greatest potential for 
yielding quick results is individual income tax. Even though income tax receipts are shown as 
direct taxation, a very large part of these collections come from withholding taxes, which are 
essentially indirect levies. According to available data, in 2008-09 less than 700,000 non- 
salaried households paid only PKR 40 billion or 0.3 per cent of GDP (or on average a tax of 
PKR 60,000 on an estimated average declared income of PKR 300,000). This group of non-
salary individuals, professionals, small businesses, traders, service providers, is at the root of 
income tax evasion problem and should be targeted for improving income tax collections. 
 
25. According to a recent head of FBR, less than one per cent of Pakistan’s 180 million 
citizens pay income tax and no one is believed to have been prosecuted for tax evasion in 25 
years. Reportedly, FBR is determined to force the rich little to pay their fair share by using 
both a carrot and a stick approach. To instill fear, FBR plans policy of ‘name and shame’ and 
the wrong doers will be threatened with freezing of assets and a ban on travel. Apparently 
National Data and Registering Authority (NADRA) has profiled over 2 million possible 
offenders based on use of cars, houses, bank accounts and overseas travel.1  
 
26. Basing the estimation of the incidence of income tax on the size of the population 
estimated at 181 million in 2012 is misleading. The unit that pays or should pay income tax is 
the household. Pakistan has about 30 million households. The six million top 20 percent 
households by income who receive roughly 50 percent of the national disposable income, 
with an estimated average income of close to PKR 1.5 million per household, should be the 
main focus of the income tax administration. Excluding say a million households who can 
claim exemption because of agricultural income, would still leave 5 million households with 
a minimum income equal to or more than the average national household income, at present 
around half a million annually. The present coverage appears to be around 1.5 million 
households or 33 per cent of the total. Looking at the problem of tax avoidance or 
underpayment from the perspective of households makes the problem seem more 
manageable.  
 
27. Developing a medium term plan to cover most persons who are liable but at present 
do not pay income tax thus deserves the highest priority. However, any such plan cannot 
succeed without strong political will and a well-paid but honest tax collection service.  
 
National Tax strategy 
 
28. On the technical level and given the need for a coherent national tax strategy, a 
National Tax Policy Office (NTPO) is required that would do all the ground work for policy 
directions and choices for all taxes at the federal and provincial levels. Such an office was 
recommended by the Taxation Committee as far back as 2002. It should be located in the 
Ministry of Finance and should have the responsibility for coordinating policy analysis and 
approaches with the provinces as well. The NTPO should be supported by Tax Policy 
                                                          
1 Dawn Newspaper 4th October 2012 
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Research Institute to be funded jointly by the government and the private sector. The ad hoc 
approaches are clearly not working. At the same time, consideration should be given to the 
establishment of high level Tax Reform Commission which could provide guidance for not 
only tax policy but tax administration issues.  
 
29. The casualness with which the goal of increasing the tax-to-GDP ratio to 15 per cent 
in four or five years is suggested or agreed to is worrying. It should be recognized that it will 
take an average economic growth rate of 6 per cent per annum over the next five years and 
an economy wide marginal tax rate of close to 20 per cent to achieve that target. If the 
average growth remains sluggish, say 3-4 per cent per annum, rapid improvement in tax 
ratio would be even more difficult. This does not argue for setting less ambitious targets but 
merely to stress the critical importance of accelerating growth and launching a serious effort 
to mobilize revenue. 
 
30. The potential for increasing tax revenue in the provinces is considerable because at 
present they collect a mere 0.5 per cent of their combined GDP. As mentioned above, both 
increased property taxation and a meaningful agricultural tax should be pursued. As 
discussed below there is also a strong economic efficiency case for sharply increasing water 
rates and earmarking the revenue for land leveling and canal improvements. Overall, a target 
of increasing provincial tax revenue from 0.5 per cent of to 1.5 per cent of GDP would appear 
quite feasible to be realized over a period of three years. Reaching the target should be made 
retroactively as a condition for a larger provincial share in the federal divisible pool. The 
Council for Common Interest (CCI) could be used for arriving at this agreement.    
 
31.  A discussion of Pakistan’s tax issues must touch on the large informal sector. This 
sector has never been fully captured in the GDP statistics. Incorporating it would suggest a 
faster GDP growth in recent years as service sectors, small scale industry, and non-crop 
agriculture have accounted for much of the growth in economic activity. It is not clear that 
the income tax authorities have sufficient outreach to these sectors most notably the 
flourishing and very successful fashion and ‘IT cottage’ industries. In general  the escaping of 
the tax net especially by small scale industrial enterprises not only deprives the government 
of revenue but also acts against achieving economies of scale, a factor that inhibits export 
competitiveness. The tax authorities thus need to give more attention to taxation of high end 
luxury goods as well as small scale industry and service sector providers. 
 
32. The Seventh National Finance Commission (NFC) increased the share of the 
provinces in the divisible pool. Apart from the larger provincial share, Baluchistan and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) provinces were given additional resources; the former for 
reasons of its size and the latter because of the expenditure related to combating insurgency. 
The Ministry of Finance is concerned that with only 30 per cent of the total revenues 
available to it, it is highly constrained in financing some of the high priority programs that 
still remain its responsibility after the passage of the 18th Amendment. It believes that the 
award did not create incentives for the provinces to raise resources of their own. One result 
of this is that the share of provincial revenues in the total raised nationwide is declining.  
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Level and Effectiveness of Public Spending 
 
33. Public sector spending accounts for about 20 per cent of Pakistan’s GDP. This 
proportion is unlikely to rise in the medium term: the much needed increase in the tax-to-
GDP ratio would be largely offset by the necessary reduction in the very high overall fiscal 
deficits. 
 
34. The effectiveness of public spending is therefore a central issue. At present there are 
several problems with the structure of spending: considerable waste in administrative 
expenditures, high levels of defense outlays, provision of generous subsidies to non-poor, 
large losses made by major public enterprises and a greatly overextended development 
program—involving both low priority projects and long gestation periods—which yield sub-
optimal economic impacts. 
 
35. Comprehensive public expenditure reviews both at the provincial and federal level 
should be undertaken and completed by the end of March 2013. The objectives should be to: 
 introduce a strict austerity regime for at least the next two years for administrative 
expenditure and discretionary spending other than high priority social spending 
items,  
 improve the balance between development and defense spending, 
 ensure that critical infrastructure gaps begin to be reduced, and 
 maximize the short- and medium-term impact of development projects in the 
pipeline.  
 
36. Surprisingly even though growth has been slow during the last four years, there are 
few signs of a pullback of spending either in the public sector or in the private sector. In the 
public sector, pressure for expanding security-related spending, large energy subsidies and 
inability to control losses of large public enterprises are the principal reasons for overall 
fiscal deficit. These are at a high level given the relative stagnation of tax revenues. But it is 
also true that no real effort has been made to control discretionary spending at either the 
federal or the provincial levels. Public salary and pension increases have been generous and 
miscellaneous expenditure has been increasing. Excluding defense spending, interest 
payments and subsidies, federal current expenditures in nominal terms more than doubled 
over the three years from FY 2009 to FY 2012 and a similar increase was recorded in 
provincial non-development spending. Allowing for inflation, the increase in general 
government expenditures including subsidies but excluding defense and interest payment 
has been of the order of 30-35 per cent over the three year period. 
 
37.  Against this background, the institution of an austerity regime for a couple of years 
and strict control of salaries and other discretionary spending seems not only absolutely 
necessary but also quite feasible.  
 
Adjustment Path and Financing of Budget Deficits 
 
38. There is need for full transparency in budget-making. Counting of buildup of arrears 
and circular debt or temporary parking of public enterprise losses elsewhere should not 
become parts of the budget-making exercise as has been the case in the past. These practices 
have reduced the credibility of the government in its dealings with foreign governments and 
development and financial institutions.  
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39. Given the severity of the budgetary situation and the depressed state of private sector 
investment, it is felt that a gradual reduction of fiscal deficit from 8 per cent to 4 per cent of 
GDP over the three-year period from FY 2014 to FY 2016 would be justified provided:  
 strong actions are taken to  increase tax revenue both at the federal  and provincial 
levels;  
 plans are initiated to eliminate revenue deficit and negative government savings by 
FY 2016 
 the dependence on financing of the budget deficit from bank borrowing (including 
from the SBP) is reduced immediately to no more than one per cent of GDP per 
annum. There seems to be no particular advantage in limiting borrowing from SBP 
while it provides liquidity to the commercial banks so that they can make substantial 
loans to the public sector.  
 
40. In the interim, before fiscal deficits can be financed from non-inflationary means, the 
government must aggressively push the sale of public assets including share of state-owned 
public companies and step up efforts to mobilize private savings including the development 
of a market for long-term government paper for individuals and small businesses. At present 
because investment is sluggish, a lot of private money is taking the form of capital flight. 
 
41. The Sixth NFC in January 1997 made the larger share in divisible pool provided to 
the provinces contingent on their taxing of agricultural incomes. The provinces committed 
themselves to taxing agricultural incomes at the rate 2 per cent per annum. This was to be 
done by using a production price index for estimating incomes from agriculture. However, 
the index to be used was not linked to the rate of inflation. Consequently the tax rate related 
to agriculture income has declined to less than one per cent of combined provincial product 
in 2011-12. Restoring–preferably increasing–the incident of tax on agricultural incomes 
should be taken up by the Federal Government in the Council of Common Interests, a 
constitutional arrangement meant to resolve issues between the provinces or between the 
provinces and the Federal Government. A revenue mobilization program to be adopted by 
the provinces should be developed by the Federal Government with targets fixed for the next 
five years in terms of the proportion of the provincial product that would be realized in terms 
of tax revenues. Such a program should include incomes from agriculture, services and 
property.  
 
Strengthening Balance of Payments 
 
42. Regardless of whether another program with the IMF would be necessary or can be 
agreed, serious attention must, therefore, be given to strengthening the underlying balance 
of payments position which remains weak. After a spurt, mainly due to higher prices, exports 
have essentially stagnated. The trade deficit running at USD 20 billion annually is now being 
financed almost entirely by huge worker remittances. Furthermore, the future of fairly 
sizable coalition forces support is uncertain. Moreover, the capital account is under pressure 
not only because large payments are due to the Fund but also foreign investment flows have 
declined sharply and the net inflow on account of long terms loans has also become modest. 
 
43.  A large part of the pressure on the imports side is emanating from large petroleum 
payments which totaled USD 14.4 billion in FY 2012 and are running at about the same level 
in the first four months of the current year. But because of Pakistan’s energy situation and 
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the likely course of international oil prices, Pakistan cannot expect much relief on this 
account. 
 
44. The strengthening of the current account balance payments must, therefore, come 
mainly from rapid expansion in exports. As discussed later in detail, Pakistan has 
progressively lost market share to almost all major developing countries during the last 
several decades. It is imperative that this trend be reversed if growth is to be revived and the 
balance of payment has to become viable. In the absence of strong exports, the desired 
revival of investment from the present low level would intensify the current account 
difficulties. 
 
45.  The various elements that would help develop exports rapidly are also discussed as a 
part of revival of growth strategy. Here it is enough to mention that foreign private 
investment in directly productive sectors would not only help in finding markets, improving 
technologies, and upgrading worker skills but would also greatly strengthen the capital 
account of the balance of payments. 
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Strategy for Reviving Growth 
 
 Need for a Comprehensive Growth Strategy  
 
46. The above discussion noted the deep fiscal and foreign exchange crises that the 
country faces and provides both general and specific recommendations for sharply reducing 
macro-economic balances and reviving confidence in the economy. These will require 
difficult choices for the new leadership who in order to avoid a collapse of the economy 
would have to ask for sacrifices and cooperation of the population; especially the well-to-do 
sections—something that the people of Pakistan have rarely been asked to do. 
 
47. But in order to win public support for tough economic choices, the new government 
must present an economic vision and a strategy of inclusive development in which future 
rewards become available to all segments of the population and to all parts of the country. 
 
48. The past pattern of economic growth and developments in Pakistan has been deeply 
flawed: economic rents, along with public corruption rather than genuine entrepreneurship 
and initiative have too frequently been the source of economic gain with the state as the 
benefactor: the distribution of growth benefits has been inequitable as job creation has 
lagged, as education of the masses has been neglected and fiscal policy has failed to play a 
role in redistributing income: and  too heavy  a reliance on external assistance and flows  has 
meant that periods of high growth have rarely been sustainable. 
 
49. So avoiding a financial meltdown, runaway inflation, and sharply declining value of 
the rupee would be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for economic revival with a new 
face. To aim at least doubling the GDP growth rate, from the present level of 3 per cent or so 
over the next four or five years, with more balanced sharing of benefits of growth would 
require major structural shifts in both governance and economic policies. 
 
50. Hopefully the political order would continue to change towards greater sharing of 
power among state institutions and levels of government, greater accountability of public 
officials enforced by a rule of law, vigilant judiciary, informed and free media, and 
increasingly robust civil society. This will facilitate a greater acceptance of austerity and a 
national discourse on development approaches and strategy. 
 
Planning Commission’s Framework for Economic Growth 
 
51. In what it called the ‘Framework for Economic Growth (FEG)’, the Planning 
Commission came up with what amounts to a new theory of development for Pakistan. The 
Commissions’ work on growth started with a criticism of the approaches adopted in the past. 
It believes that in the past the emphasis on investment–particularly by the public sector–
created a number of growth-retarding distortions in the economy. “An unintended 
consequence of our policies has been the stifling of internal markets, cities and communities 
which play a critical role in fostering productivity, innovation and entrepreneurship and 
ultimately promote growth, and prosperity and development” wrote the authors of the 
report. “The Planning Commission has been involved in the formulation of Perspective, 
Medium and Annual Development Plans based on a savings-driven approach where growth 
rates are arbitrarily set and incremental capital (investment) to output ratios are used to 
generate investment requirements in key sectors of the economy. Public investment across 
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sectors is allocated according to the planners’ priorities. It is assumed that public sector 
development program will not crowd out private investment”. After offering this criticism of 
the past, the Planning Commission promised a strategy that would factor in Pakistan’s 
situation in 2010-11 and also the development in economic thought. “Never has there been a 
more passing need in Pakistan’s history to search for a new model”. It suggests that the 
country needs to move from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ growth2.  
 
52.  ‘Hard’ approach means large public sector investments in brick and mortar 
development–building roads, bridges and dams and, yes, building buildings. What was 
needed were a combination of efforts that would improve the quality of governance, less 
interference by the government in the working of the private sector, encouraging greater 
innovation within the economy, and greater focus on the activities that would produce higher 
rates of growth with low rates of development. Implicit in this strategy was the recognition 
that it will take a long time to increase the rate of investment, in particular by the public 
sector. For this to happen, it will require some fundamental changes in the tax system, 
something for which there was no or little political appetite. Nonetheless, the economy could 
be made to perform better by improving its efficiency. In the jargon of economics the 
policymakers should work to lower the incremental capital output ratio.  
 
53. However, the Commission did not recognize that the ‘soft’ approach would take a 
long time to become embedded in the structure of the economy. Following it would not help 
the country climb out of the low growth trap into which it had fallen. Recognizing, albeit 
implicitly, that the existing institutional structures and the prevalent style of governance 
could not place the economy on a higher growth plane, the FEG put its faith in the private 
sector. This is a throwback to the approach advocated in the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
by a number of Washington-based think tanks and development institutions. This was the 
reason why the policies they advocated came to be called The Washington Consensus. 
 
54. The Planning Commission has rightly emphasized the importance of governance and 
private sector and has rightly criticized over-emphasis on Public Sector Development 
Programme (PSDP) in past strategies. However, it is believed that by pursuing the strategy 
proposed by the Commission, Pakistan will not rescue the economy from its current slump. 
The role of state and public policies in accelerating growth and ensuring greater fairness in 
the society cannot and should not be ignored. No doubt the incoming governments would 
face the major challenge of restoring public institutions, enforcing the rule of law and 
strengthening public accountability mechanisms. But the political order is moving in the 
direction of facing these challenges under pressure by an active judiciary, a free media and 
civil society. 
 
Need for a Comprehensive Development Strategy 
 
55. Beyond tackling the immediate and urgent problems of macro-economic imbalances, 
there is need for a longer-term vision and a comprehensive long term strategy which aims 
not only at reviving strong sustained growth but also making it more equitable. It is not the 
purpose here to present such a strategy but merely to highlight the following key elements 
that have been relatively ignored in the past and deserve renewed focus and priority. 
 
                                                          
2 Planning Commission. Towards a New Growth Strategy. Islamabad, The Planning Commission, January 2011.  
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 Improving Governance 
 Increasing Export Orientation 
 Renewed focus on Human Resource Development 
 Moderating Population Growth 
 Reviving Savings and Investments but focusing especially on productivity growth 
 Managing the Energy Crisis 
 Reinvigorating both agricultural and industrial growth 
 
Improving the Quality of Governance 
 
56. One important theme that runs through this paper is that the Pakistani state–which 
means the numerous institutions that support the working of the government and guide the 
interaction of the citizenry with them–has been weakened over time. This weakening was the 
result of many factors, most notably the political roller-coaster ride Pakistan has been on 
ever since it became an independent state 65 years ago. With frequent changes in the 
political order, the state’s institutional structure did not have the time to develop. There is 
now an opportunity for the political order to develop towards a genuinely representative 
system of government. There is now consensus in the country that Pakistan should be 
governed by a system that gives voice to its diverse population. This implies the 
establishment of a durable political order. 
 
57. This raises an important question: how should the state improve the functioning of 
the institutions of governance? Our approach would not result in expanding the role of the 
state in the economy but by improving it. A number of small steps should be taken that 
would incrementally improve the working of the government. The focus should be on close 
collaboration between the public and the private sectors.    
 
58. In a real sense, improving governance must be key element in a growth strategy. If 
the quality of governance had not deteriorated as much as it did in the last several years, if 
the strength of public institutions had not eroded over time, if adequate resources had been 
mobilized through taxation to provide basic public services especially law and order and 
education, the growth challenge would have been less severe. Over time, growth and 
governance problems became increasingly intertwined. Because growth benefits were not 
widely shared, the quality of public services especially education deteriorated and the pace of 
poverty reduction slowed. Consequently, there was a palpable increase in social tension, with 
increasing frequency in ethnic, sectarian and random violence.  
 
59. Now, the biggest threat to the country and the economy comes from the militants and 
Jihadists who would like to impose their narrow version of Islam on the society. Only 
belatedly is there a realization that the ‘Pakistani Taliban’ poses an existentialist threat to the 
county. It was reported in the press that the military, following an exceptionally bloody 
December 2012, changed its strategy, recognizing militancy as the most important threat the 
country faced at this time. The new doctrine was added to the Army’s ‘green book’ under the 
chapter ‘sub-conventional warfare’. According to one newspaper report, the Green Book says 
that “some organizations are out to annihilate Pakistan and their terrorist activities in tribal 
and urban areas are aimed at achieving the same target. These attacks are planned very 
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skillfully and can be countered through a matching expertise.”3 The perceived threat from 
India had been central to the military’s strategy up to this point. Now that the military is fully 
on board, new political leadership would have to prepare the country for strong actions both 
against sectarian violence and Talibinization. If the country cannot counter the threat from 
the extremists, its future as a modern, moderate, and prosperous society will be at great risk. 
 
60. Without necessarily increasing the role of the state, governance can be improved 
significantly through: 1) the erection of a firewall between executive authority and the 
accountability mechanisms and strengthening the deterrents to prevent the abuse of power 
and breaking of the law. It would be fair to say that Pakistan has one of worst records in 
punishing wrong doers, whether politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen or military leaders; 
(2) taking effective steps to de-centralize authority to the local government level initially at 
least for social services; (3) making serious efforts to reform the civil service and restore the 
independence of public institutions through autonomy, proper selection of top management 
and professional staff, and adequate pay; and (4) encouraging and respecting civil society at 
all levels of government. 
 
Accountability 
 
61. Pakistan has tried several institutional mechanisms for ensuring that public officials, 
both elected and those belonging to the various administrative services, will be accountable 
for carrying out the duties entrusted to them. Each institution ultimately was politicized, 
losing the confidence of the citizenry. Three improvements in the existing system should 
help to restore confidence. Following the approach adopted in India, Pakistan too should 
pass a law that would allow citizens to obtain information about the actions taken by 
government officials and the practices followed by various ministries and departments. It 
was access to this information that led to the discovery of a number of malpractices by 
various Indian government agencies including the sale of G2 mobile phone licenses and 
grant of coal mining concessions to private operators.            
 
De-centralization 
 
62. Under President Musharraf there was introduction of a genuine–albeit ambitious– 
devolution plan transferring several powers from the federal and provincial governments to 
the local level.4 The lynchpin of the plan was the elected office of District Nazim (head) with 
substantial authority and responsibilities for economic and social development functions. It 
is not clear, however, whether the local government system devised by President Musharraf 
will survive. The provincial government in general and members of national and provincial 
assemblies in particular regard elected local district heads as competitors for influence in 
their respective domains.  
 
63. The Sindh Government seems particularly opposed to the transfer of much authority 
to elected local representatives. There is a political divide in the province. Although the PPP 
and the MQM are coalition partners in both the federal and provincial governments, the two 
parties have very different agendas. The MQM’s main constituency is urban Sindh, in 
particular the city of Karachi. The PPP appeals to the countryside. A decentralized system of 
government with power in the hands of elected mayors suits the MQM; the PPP prefers a 
                                                          
3 The Nation. New Army Doctrine declares guerrilla activities, bombings as biggest threat. 3 January 2013, p. 1.   
4  For details see Chapter 8 of 2010 Annual Report of IPP. 
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more centralized political order. Under pressure from MQM the coalition government in 
Sindh has proposed a hybrid system of local government in which only major urban centers 
will have de-centralized authority.  
 
64. The danger of elite capture and further increase in corruption are often cited as 
arguments against devolving too much authority to local governments. These dangers are 
real but can be mitigated by instituting the office of independent provincial prosecutors for 
all districts who will be responsible only to the Federal or Provincial Ombudsman depending 
on the nature of crimes being investigated. In addition, the provincial government in making 
budgetary allocations should remain responsible for oversight, regulation and monitoring of 
the quality and quantity of services delivered. 
 
65. On the positive side, healthy competition among districts could improve their 
performance as Nazims attempt to burnish their reputations and attempt to showcase their 
administrative skills. 
 
66. Also, without devolution much needed improvements in public service delivery 
especially education will not take place. Public expenditure on education at 2 per cent of 
GDP is woefully inadequate. However, some political promises to treble or quadruple this 
level of expenditure are totally unrealistic because of the financial constraint the country 
faces. The fact is that, as discussed later, public schools are steadily losing ground to private 
schools even in the rural areas where private schools do not charge very high fees. The 
quality of public sector education remains a critical concern–there is evidence of the 
presence of ‘ghost schools’ and ‘phantom teachers’ in the system that claim scarce resources 
without providing the needed services. These failings require structural solutions such as 
transfer of authority to local bodies, public-private partnerships, and even school vouchers 
that can be used in private schools. 
 
67. The public sector can and should play leadership and catalytic roles. Shahbaz Sharif’s 
(Punjab’s Chief Minister) initiative, called the Danish schools, can produce positive results 
including creating pride in the excluded communities studying in excellent institutions 
located in their midst. But these schools are expensive to establish and manage. One 
approach would be to involve the private sector in this initiative. Civil society in the districts 
could be encouraged through promotion, land grants and selective subsidies to establish 
such schools countrywide on a scale and speed that is not likely to be possible otherwise. 
 
Civil Society 
  
68. Pakistan needs to draw lessons from countries where the state’s weakness was 
compensated for by the development of various institutions in private space. Bangladesh is a 
notable example of a country that founded several non-government organizations to provide 
the citizens the services that are normally in the domain of the state. The same trend is 
evidenced in Pakistan. The void left by the state has been filled by private institutions that 
operate in a number of different areas. It has been noted by a number of analysts that 
Pakistan is now one of the more ‘giving’ societies in the world financed by donations from 
the citizens in the country as well as those of its people who live and work abroad. These 
charitable organizations are doing impressive work in the sector of education that could 
become the basis of a new approach to increasing the extent of literacy as well as improving 
the skill base of the population. Microfinance is another area where, with the active 
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involvement of the private sector, Pakistan has outperformed even Bangladesh where this 
form of lending was institutionalized. It is worth noting that women have been very active in 
developing this part of finance. Mobile telephone banking is another important area of 
economic activity.  
 
69. Intellectual Back Up and Public Education: There is an intellectual vacuum in 
Pakistan on economic matters which hurts informed public debate and limits the impact of 
what would be a more balanced and less biased media reach. The level of academic research 
and economic literacy is low. This is partly because Pakistan has relied for long periods on 
analysis done by international financial institutions notably the World Bank and the IMF. 
Many of the domestic policy institutes remain dependent on foreign funding. 
  
70. Major organs of the state require more intellectual backup and analysis. For instance, 
the Council of Common Interest has become critically important for resolving disputes 
among provinces and between the provinces and center, and coordinating economic policies 
between center and the provinces, especially now that the provinces are at the forefront of 
development activity. The Council needs to be supported by a permanent secretariat. 
 
 A New Compact with the Private Sector 
 
71. Pakistan’s relations with the private sector have been through several iterations. The 
present system remains flawed. On one hand, the private sector continues to look to 
government for opportunities for creating economic rents through devices such as SROs. On 
the other, public sector presence and involvement in economic activity in many cases is 
either excessive or unnecessary and is source of inefficient use of resources that could be 
employed more effectively in fields such as infrastructure development. 
 
72. This may be a good time to dispel the ambiguity and define a relationship in which 
both–the state and private entrepreneurs–will have the confidence that will endure. The 
present government made an effort in this context when the Private Sector Development 
Task Force (PSDTF) was convened in the winter of 2009. It comprised both senior public 
officials as established business people. The task force was co-chaired by a Pakistan 
economist based in Washington with deep knowledge of development in many parts of the 
world and a Lahore-based businessman who was also actively involved in developing 
institutions of learning aimed especially at producing business leaders. The PSDTF met 
several times and was called upon on several occasions to brief President Asif Ali Zardari and 
then Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani. The Task Force prepared a report and presented it to 
the government. It had a detailed policy matrix with an accompanying time line for taking 
actions in the recommended areas. As has been the case with several other such efforts, the 
government took no action, keeping the report on its crowded shelf. In several places in this 
paper suggestions have been provided on how the government could work with the private 
sector to add to the amount of resources that need to be committed for developing the 
economy and improving citizen’s welfare. Specific suggestions can be summarized as follows: 
 Issue of a policy statement prepared in consultation with the private sector clearly 
defining the respective roles of the state and the private sector;  
 Issue of policy frameworks for the involvement of  private sector in the development 
of education, health and vocational training;    
 A thorough examination of the regulatory landscape with the aim of weeding out 
those regulations that have lost their relevance. Some of them such as those 
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pertaining to agricultural processing and marketing are redundant and are in place 
since they have created rent-seeking for some vested interests. At the same time 
existing regulatory agencies like SECP, CCP, OGRA, NEPRA should be strengthened 
and made more autonomous. 
 Formulation of a program for the privatization of some of the economic assets that 
remain under the control of the public sector. These include PIA, National Shipping 
Corporation and Karachi Steel Mills. The funds generated by these sales should be 
put in the aforementioned Future Generations Fund.      
              
73. The Governments both at the federal and provincial levels also need to deepen their 
involvement with private sector bodies but especially independent institutions like the 
important Pakistan Business Council. Among the existing institutions, the role of the 
Planning Commission needs to be redefined and its function of liaison and coordination with 
provincial planning authorities needs to be considerably strengthened in light of the new 
distribution of powers. At the same time the Planning Commission needs to become a leaner 
outfit discarding some of the functions not central to the planning processes.  
 
Making Exports a Major Driver of Growth 
 
74. An important feature of Pakistan’s history is that it has continued to fall behind other 
developing countries in export development by not exploiting tremendous opportunities 
offered by international developments. Development strategies followed by various 
administrations in the country did not pay attention to having the export sector become one 
of the drivers of growth as was very successfully done by the ‘miracle economies’ of East Asia.  
 
75. The remarkable expansion in international trade in manufactures has been the 
engine of global growth and leading edge of globalization over the past several decades. 
Manufactured goods exports increased almost steadily from less than USD 200 billion in 
1970 to a peak of USD 11.5 trillion in 2011, showing an average annual growth of 10 per cent. 
While the nature of international trade in manufactures has changed quite significantly from 
finished goods to intermediate products or components, the growth trend was sustained till 
2008. However, there was a fairly sharp decline in 2009 due to the deep international 
recession but there was a quick recovery in 2010 and in 2011 where the earlier peak was 
exceeded.   
 
76. The biggest economic story of recent times is the rise of China in substantial part due 
to its spectacular success in expanding exports. Chinese manufactured exports have risen 
nearly two hundred fold over the last three decades and their share in world trade has grown 
from less than 1 per cent to 15 per cent over 1980-10. However, China is not the only country 
to have benefitted from the expansion and restructuring of global trade. Other major 
developing countries have also increased their share in world manufactured exports from 7 
per cent to 22 per cent over the period. In contrast Pakistan’s share has improved only 
marginally from 0.12 per cent to 0.16 percent and probably is lower now than it was in 1970. 
 
77. The ratios of total exports of goods and services to GDP also presents clear evidence 
of how far Pakistan has fallen behind in the export market. China and most other East Asian 
countries are in a class by themselves but traditionally inward looking economies like India, 
Turkey and Bangladesh have increased their export orientation remarkably in the last thirty 
years. In 1980, India had an export-to-GDP ratio (6 per cent) half that of Pakistan (12 per 
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cent) but in 2010 its ratio was 23 per cent—double that of Pakistan. Even Bangladesh with an 
export-to-GDP ratio of 18 per cent has moved ahead in this respect. 
 
78. There are several reasons why Pakistan has not succeeded in the export field. First, 
export growth was never a central pillar of development strategy unlike Korea, Malaysia and 
China, and more recently Turkey and Vietnam. Second, Pakistan has the least diversified 
manufactured exports among major developing countries because there was an excessive 
focus on its principal manufactured exports, textiles and clothing, and this sector was 
artificially supported for a long period through the domestic price of cotton set well below 
the international price. Furthermore, because of slow growth in productivity, insufficient 
investments in moving up the value chain in textiles and clothing, and lack of sufficient 
diversification in promising areas such as other manufactures and high valued added 
agricultural products, Pakistan’s export competitiveness has suffered. Last but not least, 
because of political tensions trade with its large neighbor India, which should be the 
country’s natural trading partner, is quite limited. Pakistan has also not availed fully the 
potential of close relationship with China to promote exports: indeed it has a large trade 
deficit with its big neighbor.  
 
Opening to India 
 
79. The gravity model of trade suggests that Pakistan should trade more with the large 
countries in its immediate neighborhood–China and India. The recent thawing in the 
relations between these two South Asian nations should add significantly to their trade and 
growth. The possibilities of expanding trade with India need to be followed up urgently and 
diligently. While there may be losers and winners resulting from this trade expansion, the 
overall impact on Pakistan will most certainly be very positive. 
 
80. At the same time to deal with the large negative balance with China, public policy 
should aim to develop supply chains that will link up with China’s large industrial sector. 
These chains should take advantage of the entrepreneurship that exists in the sector of small 
and medium engineering. 
 
81. Some will argue that the boom in world exports is over and in any case Pakistan has 
now a very steep hill to climb in terms of competitiveness. But the pessimism about further 
globalization is not justified. International comparative advantage will continue to shift. Like 
Japan earlier, the share of many East Asian countries in labor intensive manufactured goods 
has been declining. Recently the rate of exports from China has also slowed reflecting cost 
pressures emanating from higher wages; Pakistan’s exports of cotton yarn and fabrics have 
trebled in the last three years. Pakistan has the further advantage that its share in 
manufactured goods other than textiles and clothing is miniscule. So even with the slowing 
in international trade Pakistan can hope to gain market share provided it follows policies 
that strengthen competitiveness, improve the base of technology, diversify the product mix, 
and move up the value chain.   
 
82. As discussed later, in the foreseeable future, Pakistan cannot catch-up with its 
competitors in the rate of capital formation. It must rely on sharper gains in factor 
productivity to get to a high growth path. Rapidly rising exports can be an important 
instrument for improving productivity and keeping capital requirements for growth low. 
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83. The specific policy actions that should be taken to promote exports are: 
 An exchange rate which fully reflects the differential between the movements in 
Pakistan prices and the international price level, 
 A review of all SROs and their gradual elimination in three years because they 
essentially increase domestic protection and thus increase the anti-export bias. 
 Strong incentives for new investments and skill upgrading in textiles that increase 
scale and update technology while encouraging the exit of enterprises with low 
productivity and profitability 
 A determined push aimed at small and medium industries for expansion and 
export diversification in areas outside textiles  
 Joint public and private sector efforts to promote foreign investment in textiles, 
clothing and other promising export sectors from countries like Korea, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Taiwan, and also China which are losing ground in labor-
intensive industries due to high and rising wage costs. The focus of these efforts 
should be to encourage foreign investment that will help to upgrade skills and 
technology and make use of established export channels. 
 A special focus on expanding exports to regional partners especially China and 
India, the two fastest growing economies in the world. The large negative trade 
balance with these countries can provide some leverage. 
 A special and speedy implementation review of the free trade agreement and 
establishment of freed trade zone with China and assessment of their likely 
impact on exports in the near term. 
 A similar review of key constraints and principal opportunities for expanding 
trade with India 
 Focus on the development of export supply chains using the work being done in 
the context of the National Trade Corridor Improvement Project (NTCIP). 
 Strengthening monitoring mechanisms including quarterly meeting of the high 
level Export Board 
 Implementing recommendations in the  Strategic Trade Policy Framework 2009-
12 to reduce anti export bias through the withdrawal of protection from inefficient 
industries, minimization of taxation at investment stage, and elimination or zero 
rating of customs duty on important inputs to textiles and clothing exports.  
 Closer coordination of commerce ministry policies and activities not only with 
textile ministry but all other production-related ministries appears to be sorely 
needed.  
 
Human Resource Development 
 
84. By now it is fully recognized that Pakistan has neglected the development of its large 
human resources. Most indicators point to human under-development. This may be an 
appropriate time to do some out-of-the-box thinking. A suggestion in this context can be 
more aggressive public-private partnership in the areas of education and health, and giving 
special attention to having women make a larger contribution to the development of the 
economy.  
 
Role of Private Sector 
 
85. A recent Financial Times article draws the world’s attention to the role the private 
sector and private enterprise is playing in delivering a variety of services to the poorer 
segment of the population. “…at the grassroots, Pakistan is in perpetual motion, with 
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ceaseless activity as people find affordable solutions to their basic needs. These largely 
hidden forces of resilience offer the best hope for the country’s future. In Pakistan, the state 
may be fragile but society is far stronger than many think.”5 The article also points out the 
important role private charity is performing in helping the poor. This was evident at the time 
of two floods that hit the country in 2010 and 2011 respectively.  
 
86. The private sector has done extremely well in the sector of education. Low-cost 
private sector schools, charging perhaps USD 2 a week, are booming in slums and villages. 
Many such schools work in the homes of families that have girls who have received decent 
education and are prepared to put it to use to earn a living. A number of charitable 
organizations are active in building and managing schools in the country’s poorest areas. 
Each large organization follows its own business plan. To take one example: the Karachi-
based Citizens Foundation has built 900 high quality schools in the country’s poorest areas. 
The buildings that house these schools are modern and well designed. This is done to create 
community pride in the school, often located in a slum area. The teaching staff is entirely 
female, many of them graduates of the schools established by the charity.  
 
87. There are other models that are working equally well. In other words, while demand 
for education is outpacing the state’s financial and organizational capacity to meet such basic 
needs as education, the private sector has shown the capacity to fill the void. The state should 
take advantage of this. As a practical matter the state should come up with a program for 
inviting the private sector to participate in the development of neglected sectors of education 
and health. To begin with, the provinces should be encouraged to privatize some of the 
educational facilities in the public sector that are, at best, providing indifferent education.  
 
88. The same approach could be followed in the health sector with the provincial 
governments selling some of the district hospitals to private operators. 
 
Public Education 
 
89. Despite a remarkable growth in the role of  private education, it is a matter of great 
concern, as discussed earlier, that the improvement in social indicators witnessed over most 
of the past decade appears to have slowed down in last two or three years presumably under 
financial pressures and slow economic growth: 44 per cent of school age children were still 
not in school in 2011, the literacy rate among 15 years and older which had improved from 44 
per cent in 1998 to 57 per cent in 2009 was only 58 per cent in 2011—this despite a  
continued rise in female literacy that now stands at 46 per cent. Pakistan will miss the 
millennium goals in education and literacy. 
 
90. Public clamor for greater access to education and deep concerns with the quality of 
public education have led to all major parties putting stress on education in their election 
platforms. However, promises being made to raise the public expenditure from a paltry 2 per 
cent of GDP to 5-6 per cent are totally unrealistic. Given financial constraints, an increase to 
3 per cent in the next few years would be quite an achievement. A substantial part of the 
improvement in education must come from improving the efficiency of public expenditures. 
Eliminating fictitious expenditures, steps to increase teacher training, reducing teacher 
absenteeism and greater teacher accountability are largely in the domain of improved 
                                                          
5 Charles Leadbeater. Time to look again at Pakistani Society. Financial Times. November 07, 2012.   
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governance—transfer of responsibilities to local governments remains as important as 
increasing public funding for the sector.   
 
Moderating Population Growth 
 
91. It is true that Pakistan’s large population—in a world where most of the developed 
countries begin to see a fairly steep decline in working age population—in less than two 
decades can be a potential asset provided it has the right education and work skills. But it is 
also true that rapid population growth continues to hamper growth in incomes and 
employment. Therefore, population control issues deserve more attention than they are 
receiving. Fortunately, population transition has begun: the growth rate of population has 
come down to 1.8 per cent per annum. However, fertility rate is still high 3.6 compared to 
Bangladesh (2.4) and India (2.6) and so is the desired family size. This accounts for the much 
lower growth rate of population in these two countries than in Pakistan. In terms of policy 
action, focus should be on the high fertility rate of 4.5 in rural areas through continued 
acceleration of women’s education, employment opportunities for them and availability of 
family planning services. In general and especially in rural areas, continued policy efforts to 
encourage reduction in birth rates will help increase savings, reduce poverty and make it 
easier to improve social indicators. 
 
Focusing on Productivity Growth 
 
92. Reviving economic growth will require a significant increase in rate of fixed capital 
formation which touched a low of 11 per cent of GDP in 2011-12. But because of the financial 
constraints it may be difficult to raise the rate beyond say 15 per cent of GDP by 2018, much 
less than the 20 per cent required for a sustained 6-7 per cent annual growth rate. So in the 
near future a large part of the revival of growth would have to come from exploiting unused 
capacity and productivity gains. 
 
93. There are a number of ways in which economic policies can encourage productivity 
growth and disperse economic benefits without enormous amounts of investment while 
serving other objectives like raising revenues, improving wage income, and reducing 
economic rents. 
 
94. As mentioned above, promotion of labor intensive exports both manufactured goods 
and agricultural products like fruits and vegetables could have a large payoff in terms of a 
unit of investment. Similarly moving up the value chain in textiles and clothing, Pakistan’s 
principal exports, and other exports would yield productivity gains. 
 
95. One way to make sure that economic incentives do not protect low value added 
sectors would be to review and phase out SROs. This will not only improve government 
revenue but also improve equity in the society and encourage entrepreneurial behavior. As 
noted above, most SROs provide domestic protection which increases the anti-export bias. 
On the other handed under-invested areas like agricultural processing, marketing and 
storage could be provided investment incentives. There are major gains to be had in 
improving the use of inputs in agriculture notably water, fertilizer and seeds. Nothing in this 
area is quite as important as improving the efficiency of irrigation water use. 
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Efficiency of Water Use 
 
96. Without immediate attention given to the proper use of water, Pakistan will face a 
serious problem in the not too distant future. Water availability has declined from about 
5,000 cubic meters (cm) per capita in the early 1950s to less than 1,500 cm in 2010. 
According to 2008 data from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), Pakistan 
ranked last in a list of 26 Asian countries in terms of water availability. The country is 
expected to become ‘water scarce’ which is defined as a country with annual availability of 
below 1,000 cm by 2035–though some experts project that this could happen as soon as 
20206. Much of the decline is because of global warming. Few areas in the world are 
suffering as much from climate change as are the Himalayas that are estimated to be 
experiencing a thinning of the glacier cover by as much as a meter a year. A recent report by 
IFPRI has reached a number of worrying conclusions based on productivity declines for most 
major South Asian crops. It projects that wheat yields could decline by as much as one-half 
in the next quarter century.  
 
97. Where there is water there is corruption. This is evident in both rural and urban 
areas. In the countryside powerful politicians who are also large landowners have no desire 
to push for a real overhaul of farming practices. In the large cities–Karachi in particular–
‘water mafias’ charge exorbitant amounts to supply water to the parched communities. Most 
of the water they bring by trucks is stolen from the pipes in the extensive public system. 
Those responsible for managing the public water supply infrastructure are paid by the mafia 
to look the other way while water is being stolen. 
 
98. Pakistan uses most of its available water for agriculture, which is quite high as 
compared to its development counterparts. History has a lot to do with the pattern of water 
use. An estimated 90 per cent of available water is used on the farms, leaving only 10 per 
cent for other purposes. Consequently, “anywhere from around 40 to 55 million Pakistanis–
about a quarter to a third of the country’s total population–do not have access to safe 
drinking water.”7  
 
99. The solutions to the water problem are as well-known as the problem itself. The two 
important ones are worth recalling. The first is proper pricing of water that would reflect its 
scarcity; the second, better management of the vast irrigation system to reduce wastage. The 
two solutions should be taken together: the amount of resources generated from increased 
water charges could be earmarked for system maintenance. While ‘ear-marking’ is not 
favored by economists it helps to create constituencies for raising additional incomes from 
taxation. 
 
100. Proper pricing of water will also create an incentive structure that will impact the 
pattern of cropping and also bring in new water-saving technologies. Cheap water has meant 
that Pakistan has allowed extensive cultivation of high water-intensive crops such as sugar 
cane. These need to be replaced by the crops that use less water. A changed water-pricing 
structure should also create incentives for the farming community to start using technologies 
such as drip irrigation. According to Adrien Couton, a water expert who works for an NGO 
with experience in Pakistan, “...drip irrigation has particularly attractive characteristics. It 
                                                          
6 The data are from Asia Society, Asia’s Next Challenge: Setting the Region’s Water Future, New York, 2009.    
7 Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway, Running on Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis, Woodrow Wilson 
Center for Scholars, Washington Dc, 2009.    
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generates massive increase in the efficiency of water use (the increase in yield as compared to 
conventional irrigation methods is from 20 to 100 per cent while saving in water ranges from 
40 to 70 per cent). It offers much more granularity than typical infrastructure intervention, 
since no heavy capital investments are involved, and investments can be easily spread 
geographically and over time. Drip irrigation also delivers immediate benefits. Finally the 
system is to educate the end users about the immediacy of the water issue and the urgent 
need for more water efficiency”.8       
 
Role of Women  
 
101. Helping women to be become active participants in developing and modernizing the 
economy has to be an important part of the long-term growth strategy. Women’s assigned 
roles serve as drags on the economy. They affect the rate of growth in output, keeping it at a 
lower rate than would be the case if women participated more actively in the labor force. 
Pakistani economists have not factored into their analyses the role Pakistani women can play 
in developing their country if their participation in the work force was to increase and if their 
productivity increased through better education. If women figure in economic writings on 
Pakistan at all it is usually to highlight how far they have been left behind in social 
development and how this could serve as a drag on economic growth. Not enough attention 
has been paid to the fact that the real economic role of women is underestimated, 
particularly their participation in the workforce. Most of the work they do in their homes or 
the time they spend looking after the animals owned by the families is either not reported or 
not fully counted. In the writings on Pakistan both the negative and the positive 
consequences of the lack of progress in improving the wellbeing of women have not been 
fully investigated. 
 
102. Encouraging and enabling greater participation of females at all levels of society 
would not only help improve labor productivity but also work against the extremist forces 
that aim at diminishing the role of women in modern society. 
 
Skill Upgrading 
 
103. Finally much more active policies to improve literacy and upgrading labor skills are 
needed especially in information technology. This is another area in which private and public 
sector should work closely to develop appropriate policies and incentives. 
 
Managing Energy Crisis 
 
104. Over the years Pakistan’s energy sector has been studied from several different 
angles. It was looked at by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank in some detail. 
Both institutions provided technical advice as well as finance for developing the sector. More 
recently the energy problem has received the attention of the USAID. The Americans have 
identified the sector as one of their priority areas under the Kerry-Lugar initiative. They have 
concentrated their efforts on the supply side of the equation, offering assistance for several 
electricity generation projects. The Planning Commission was given the mandate to come up 
with a solution for easing the shortage in electricity supply that is causing enormous amount 
                                                          
8 Adrien Couton. “Tackling the water crisis in Pakistan: What entrepreneurial approach can do”, in Michael 
Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway (editors), Running on Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis, Woodrow Wilson 
Center for Scholars, Washington Dc, 2009. 
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of discomfort to the people and badly hurting the economy. Building upon these analyses 
some ideas are discussed that could bring about both short term easing of the situation as 
well as setting the stage for a long-term development of the sector. 
 
105. It is clear from the way the sector has developed that the problems it now faces are 
the product of poor public policy. At no time in its history, has Pakistan developed a 
consistent approach towards the development of a sector that is critical for the health and 
growth of the economy especially taking into account the sharp rise in international oil prices 
and the country’s large energy  deficit. The result is that the sources used for augmenting the 
supply of electric power did not reflect the country’s comparative advantage. Each time the 
country faced a crisis it turned to whichever source of generation was available with little 
attention given to the long-term cost to the economy of the choice that was being made.  
 
106. At this time the sector faces three problems. Each of these needs a different solution. 
To begin with there is the problem of ‘circular debt’, now estimated at PKR 872 million, 
which is the consequence of the type of contracts that were negotiated with independent 
power producers (IPPs) to solve the crisis the country faced in the 1990s. The private 
entrepreneurs who came into sector were given several guarantees, the most important of 
which was the commitment to purchase the power they produced at a pre-agreed price. 
These ‘take or pay’ contracts shifted the financial burden to Water and Power Development 
Authority (WAPDA) and by default to the government. Since the government lacked the 
political will to levy appropriate tariffs from the end-users, timely payments were not made 
to the IPPs. The circular debt became ‘circular’ when the IPPs failed to make payments to the 
suppliers of fuel to their plants. 
 
107. The second problem concerns the organizational structure of the sector. For several 
decades generation, transmission and distribution of power were the responsibility of one 
public sector entity–WAPDA. Then, advised by the World Bank, the sector was split into 
several quasi-autonomous institutions, each with its own responsibility. This was done to 
prepare some parts of the sector–distribution in particular–for privatization. That has not 
happened and the advantages available because of aggregation were lost. This advice was in 
line with the thinking of the time at which it was given–a strong belief in the ability of the 
private sector to do both economic and social good. There is no longer that blind faith in the 
working of the private sector. 
 
108. The third problem relates to sources used for generating power. These don’t 
appropriately reflect Pakistan’s endowments. The country should have relied much more on 
hydro and power produced from coal. However, the largest source is imported oil which 
accounts for 35.1 per cent of total supply. Hydel-power accounts for another 33.6 per cent. 
The share of natural gas–a dwindling resource–is 27.3 per cent. The share of nuclear power 
is 6 per cent. Coal accounts for a minuscule amount–only 0.1 percent. A central long term 
challenge is to mobilize large resources needed for Diamer-Bhasha Dam (USD 8.5 billion) or 
standalone hydro-projects. In light of reservations expressed by international development 
banks about some of these projects, alternative sources such as the prosperous Pakistani 
Diaspora or friendly countries like China, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, if necessary can be 
offered a part of the likely high return on hydro-electric power.  
 
109. In order to solve both the short- and long-term problems faced by the energy sector 
the government could explore the possibility of shifting the management and part ownership 
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of some thermal plants operating in the public sector to an entity which can sell a part of its 
share to the private sector. The entity should also issue bonds backed by its assets in order to 
liquidate the accumulated circular debt. The private sector should also be invited to 
participate in the development of renewable sources of energy, in particular solar energy.  
 
110. Under the 18th Amendment the provinces have the authority to invest in the 
development of the energy sector. This could be encouraged by the assurance that power 
supply to them from the national grid would not be reduced if they generated significant 
amounts of own supply. A market for trading powers could be developed in which the 
provinces can buy and sell electricity to each other. The implication of this for various 
provincial interests should be examined. 
 
111. As mentioned earlier, the need for further power tariff adjustment is also clear. But 
the consumer resistance to tariff increases is very real because they do not see any progress 
in reducing load shedding or reducing line losses. Simply pushing for power rate 
adjustments could be counterproductive in terms of line losses. Aggressive effort to control 
electricity, oil and gas theft must be undertaken because they will help both to improve 
revenues and to improve the image of the electric power supply companies. 
 
Reinvigorating Agricultural Growth 
 
112. In sectoral terms, revival growth would require major acceleration in growth rates of 
major sectors, agriculture and industry. Industrial growth should be led by exports and use 
of unutilized capacity due to energy shortages. 
 
113. Pakistan’s agriculture, despite its large potential, continues to underperform. 
Agricultural growth which averaged nearly 4 per cent per annum over the 40 year period 
from 1960 to 2000 slowed down to around 2.5 per cent in 2000-12. This occurred 
notwithstanding a buoyant livestock sector and sharply rising level of milk production. A 
part of the reason is the availability of water–mostly surface irrigation–which trebled 
between 1960 and 1990 and is now no longer increasing. Also there has not been any major 
breakthrough in major crop yields which continue to remain low.    
 
114. The reasons for the above are well known but no systematic attempt has been made 
to address them in public policy. The areas that need the state’s immediate attention are (a) 
increased efficiency in the use of water (discussed above); (b) improvement in the use of 
modern technologies and basing them on Pakistan’s circumstances; (c) changing the system 
of incentives in order to have a cropping pattern that conforms to the country’s comparative 
advantage; (d) modernizing agricultural marketing; and (e) increasing agricultural exports to 
the food-deficit as well as high-income countries in the neighborhood.  
 
115. In terms of crops, it is doubtful whether Pakistan would have any special comparative 
advantage in export of wheat except to Afghanistan. However, it should remain a marginal 
exporter in good years in order to ensure domestic food security. Cotton exports would be 
more promising, especially by switching to genetically modified cotton, but the bulk of future 
agricultural exports would probably come from fruits and vegetables and milk and meat.  
Detailed studies on possibilities of agricultural exports are needed. 
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116. Pakistan needs to invest more in improving the technological base of the agricultural 
sector. The country inherited a fairly well developed system that combined agriculture 
education, research and extension. Not much was done after independence to keep the 
system current and expand its scope. This is one reason why agricultural productivity has 
fallen so far behind that of India. This is another area where a partnership with the private 
sector could help. The government should invite the private sector–especially that part of the 
sector that is now involved in processing and marketing of agricultural products–to join 
hands with the government to set up institutions devoted to research and extension.  
 
Inclusive Growth and Poverty Reduction 
 
117. A strong revival of growth on the lines suggested above would help reduce poverty 
and contribute to a fairer share of growth benefits. Development experiences of China and 
India over the last few decades suggest that high growth through tightening of labor market 
and increasing real wages has been a major factor in lifting millions out of poverty. Pakistan 
cannot of course hope to achieve annual growth rates of 8-9 per cent in the near term. But 
much greater emphasis on job creation through expansion of labor intensive exports, small, 
industry and agriculture could dramatically transform the employment situation especially 
for women and educated but un-employed youth. On the other hand, strictly controlling 
economic rents and corruption practices that benefit the few would improve government 
revenues and enable access to good quality social services for the poor and middle classes. 
This does not necessarily mean that there would be no scope for increasing direct income 
support programs for the poor. For the present, however, the priority should be to improve 
the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) that seems to be generally working well but is, 
nonetheless, marred by some corruption and favoritism. In any case, it would be a mistake, 
however, to try to abolish the program or change its name for political reasons. 
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Summary & Key Policy Actions 
 
Public Finances 
 
118. In order to improve the fundamental weaknesses of public finances Pakistan needs a 
National Tax Policy and a strong political will to enforce effective implementation. The 
establishment of a National Tax Policy Office should be initiated. 
 
119. In the meanwhile, a three year fiscal framework needs to be developed in the next 
three months. The goals should be to reduce the overall fiscal deficit to 4 per cent of GDP by 
FY 2016, eliminating the large revenue account deficit, and improving the tax-to-GDP ratio 
from 10 per cent in FY 2012 to 13 per cent. The main improvement in tax revenues should be 
planned from personal income tax collections at the centre and property and agricultural 
taxation in the provinces, as discussed earlier. 
 
120. Both in the medium and long run much larger collections from the Federal Income 
Tax from individuals not yet in the tax net must be a critical pillar of a sound fiscal policy. 
Specifically, the Federal Board of Revenue should be given the target of bringing into the tax 
net a million non-salary households with a tax payment of at least 1 per cent of GDP over the 
next three years and should be asked to provide a credible plan to achieve this target. 
 
121. A resource mobilization program for the provinces, the raising of provincial tax-to-
GDP ratios from 0.5 to 1.5, should be agreed in the Council of Common Interest and should 
become the condition for meeting the resource transfer targets set out in the Seventh 
National Finance Commission Award.  
 
122. In order to improve the effectiveness of public spending, comprehensive public 
expenditure reviews both at the provincial and federal level should be undertaken and 
completed by the end of March 2013. The immediate objectives should be to introduce a 
strict austerity regime for at least next two years for administrative expenditure and to 
maximize the short and medium term impact of development projects in the pipeline. 
 
123. The dependence on financing of the budget deficit from Bank borrowing (including 
from the SBP) is reduced immediately to 1 per cent of GDP per annum. At the same time, the 
government must aggressively push the sale of public assets including state land and share of 
state-owned public companies.   
 
124. A ‘Fund for Future Generations’ (FFG) should be established from the revenues 
received by the sale of public land and public sector enterprise. The FFG should be 
independently managed with its own expert staff doing investment analysis.    
                                                 
Revival of Growth  
  
125. The revival of growth strategy should aim initially at restoring the growth rate of the 
economy to 6 per cent of GDP by FY 2016. In the current circumstances of widespread 
energy shortages and a low rate of investment, much of the acceleration of growth must 
come largely from higher productivity in factor use—more efficient use of capital and labor, 
and inputs like water and energy. The four key but inter-related elements that are the focus 
of economic revival in this paper are: 
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i. Improved Governance 
ii. A clearer policy framework for the Private Sector and closer Private-Public 
Partnership 
iii. Much greater attention to trade strategy and priorities and induction of private 
foreign investment in support of exports, and 
iv. Quick resolution of serious power and gas shortages 
  
Improving Governance 
 
126. Without necessarily increasing the role of the state, governance can be improved 
significantly through: 
 
 Erection of a firewall between executive authority and the accountability 
mechanisms and strengthening the deterrents to prevent the abuse of power and 
breaking of the law. It would be fair to say that Pakistan has one of worst records 
in punishing wrong doers whether politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen or 
military leaders.  
 Appointment of the Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau for non-
renewable six year term. The process set in place for the appointment of the Chief 
Election Commission could be replicated in this case.        
 Taking effective steps to de-centralize authority to the local government level 
initially at least for social services. 
 Making serious efforts to reform the civil service and restore the independence of 
public institutions through autonomy, proper selection of top management and 
professional staff and adequate pay  
 Encouraging and respecting civil society at all levels of government. 
 Since the Council of Common Interest has become critically important in 
coordinating federal and provincial policy actions, a strong independent 
secretariat needs to be set up to support and assist Council’s work. 
 
New Compact with the Private Sector 
 
 Issue a policy statement prepared in consultation with the private sector clearly 
defining the respective roles of the state and the private sector;  
 Issue policy frameworks for the involvement of  private sector in the development 
of education, health and vocational training;    
 A thorough examination of the regulatory landscape with the aim of weeding out 
those regulations that have lost their relevance. Formulation of a program for 
privatization of some of the economic assets that remain under the control of the 
public sector—these include PIA, National Shipping Corporation and Karachi 
Steel Mills. The funds generated by these sales should be put in the Funds for 
Future Generations.      
 The Commerce Ministry should publish all the SROs that have been adopted to-
date by the government. These SROs should be withdrawn within a period of 
three years, to be incorporated in the General Trade Policy. 
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Trade and Foreign Investment 
 
127. Pakistan has progressively lost market share to almost all major developing countries 
during the last several decades. It is imperative that this trend be reversed if growth is to be 
revived and the balance of payment has to become viable. In the absence of strong exports, 
the desired revival of investment from the present low level would intensify the current 
account difficulties. Expanded trade with the neighbors especially India and China, and 
induction of foreign private investment in directly productive sectors, would not only help in 
finding markets, improving technologies and upgrading worker skills but would also greatly 
strengthen the capital account of the balance of payments.  
 
128. Some suggestions are as follows: 
 
 India should be granted the most favored nation status. 
 A permanent committee to watch over the development of trade between India 
and Pakistan should be set up with members drawn from both the public and 
private sectors. The committee should be provided with a secretariat of its own so 
that it can do the analysis that will be needed. The Committee should be required 
to table a report every year for discussion and adoption by the National Assembly. 
 A quarterly meeting of the Export Board should be held every quarter 
 A special effort be made in collaboration with the private sector to attract foreign 
investment in export field from newly industrialized friendly countries notably 
China, Korea and Malaysia. 
 A quick review should be undertaken why some international agreements on 
trade and investment notably with China have suffered implementation delays 
and their execution should be speeded up. 
Energy 
 
129. The factors that constrain the use of existing power generation capacity should be 
effectively dealt with including the annual build up of circular debt.  
 
130. There is general agreement that relieving the energy shortages is the most critical 
need for the economy. The need for further power tariff adjustment is also clear. But the 
consumer resistance to tariff increases is very real because they do not see any progress in 
reduction of load shedding or line losses. The near term plans must promise reduction of 
theft though early installation of proof meters and institution of strong penalties.  
 
131. The organizational structure of the sector with heavy concentration of authority and 
responsibility directly or indirectly needs to be revisited. The involvement of provincial 
governments and the private sector on a range of activities including generation should be 
pursued on a priority basis and the freedom to delegate final pricing decisions to private 
sector, local government should also be explored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
